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DEFEATING THE AGRICULTURAL EXEMPTION:
THE NORRIS LAGUARDIA ACT AS A MEANS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR AGRICULTURAL LABOR
I. INTRODUCTION
The freedom to collectively bargain without the fear of being fired
by an employer is one of the most fundamental of all liberties guar-
anteed to the American worker.I This statement reflects the public
policy of the United States, as indicated in the Norris LaGuardia Act
(NLA),2 one of the many pieces of labor-related legislation to come out
of the turbulent labor movement of the 1930s. The NLA, known mostly
for limiting the power of federal courts to issue injunctions in labor
disputes, 3 also legalizes the right of workers to engage in collective bar-
gaining without the fear of retaliation or discharge from the employer. 4
However, without the protection of the NLA, agricultural workers
who attempt to collectively bargain are left unprotected from employer
retaliation or discharge. This is because other labor legislation, such as
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)5 and the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA),6 contain a general agricultural worker exemption. 7 There-
fore, agricultural workers are not afforded any of the protections of the
seminal labor legislation in this country. 8
The NLA provides an alternative for the agricultural worker. The
NLA protects all workers from retaliation or discharge for collective
bargaining attempts.9 This right is guaranteed to all workers since the
1. See N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937) (declaring that workers
have a "fundamental right" to choose their own representatives for collective bargaining purposes
without employer interference).
2. Norris LaGuardia Act of 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (hereinafter NLA) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1994 & West Supp. 1998)).
3. See id. § 101 (1994).
4. See id. § 102 (1994) (stating that the unorganized worker should have the "full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing ... and that he
shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor...").
5. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (hereinafter NLRA) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994 & West Supp. 1998)).
6. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (hereinafter FLSA) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 & West Supp. 1998)).
7. The NLRA offers some protection for workers fighting discharge claims because of concert-
ed activity but exempts agricultural labor from its definition of "employee." This exemption results in
agricultural laborers being unable to bring claims under the NLRA for unfair labor practices should
the worker be discharged for engaging in concerted activity with his or her fellow workers. See 29
U.S.C. § 152(3); see also 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) (exempting agricultural labor under the FLSA from
benefiting from its overtime and maximum hours provision).
8. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3); 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) (exempting farm labor from the NLRA and the
FLSA).
9. See 29 U.S.C § 102 (ensuring workers' collective bargaining rights).
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NLA contains no exemptions.10 However, the agricultural worker re-
mains exposed to employer retaliation and discharge. This is because of
the assertion that the exclusion of farm laborers from the NLRA should
preclude their protection under the NLA as well. 11 However, the NLA
does not exclude farm labor, and is one of the only laws which may be
used to effectively protect agricultural workers in their efforts to improve
their working conditions.' 2 Thus, the NLA must be available to provide
substantive protection to farm labor engaged in collective action.
This Note attempts to reconcile the inclusion of agricultural workers
within the reading of the NLA with similar legislation such as the NLRA.
Section II of this Note will discuss the historical setting from which the
NLA was enacted. Specifically, this Section details the injustices faced
by all workers at the time, particularly from the widespread use of
judicial injunctions used to prohibit workers of all industries from any
type of collective action. 13
Section III examines the historical context of the farm worker exclu-
sion from the major pieces of American labor legislation such as the
NLRA and FLSA.14 Specifically, this Section will discuss the history of
labor-related New Deal legislation of the 1930s and the role it played in
the farm worker exemption in these pieces of legislation. Section III
also sets forth the reasons for the agricultural worker exemption to the
NLRA and FLSA and addresses the fact that they do not preclude the
inclusion of agricultural workers within the protection of the NLA.15
Section IV of this Note will discuss the NLA as an alternative for
agricultural worker protection. The NLA will be discussed as a legis-
10. See id. (excluding no class of workers from the NLA's protection).
11. See Respondent's Brief at 26, Rauda v. Oregon Roses, Inc., 935 P.2d 469 (Or. Ct. App. 1997)
(No. 9410-75CV) (referencing Appellant's argument that exclusion of agricultural workers from the
NLRA should exclude them from Oregon's NLA). However, the court rejected this argument by
stating that it could find no indication from the legislative history of the acts which would dictate the
exclusion of farm workers from the NLA. See Rauda v. Oregon Roses, Inc., 935 P.2d 469, 473 (Or.
Ct. App. 1997), review granted, 952 P.2d 60 (Or. 1997).
12. Unlike the NLRA, the NLA contains no exemption of agricultural workers, or workers of any
class. See 29 U.S.C. § 102.
13. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: LABOR ORGANIZATIONS 5
(Robert F. Koretz ed. 1970) (discussing the widespread use of the judicial injunction against labor).
14. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) (1994 & West Supp. 1998) (exempting
agricultural workers from the NLRA and the FLSA).
15. See Rauda, 935 P.2d at 473 (declaring the public policy of Oregon as evidenced through the
state's NLA to confer substantive rights onto agricultural workers); Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 888 P.2d
147, 155 (Wash. 1995) (deciding that the legislative intent of Washington's NLA and the public policy
of the state protects workers from wrongful discharge). But see Respondent's Brief at 18, Rauda (No.
9410-75CV) (referring to the Appellant's argument that the exclusion of farm workers from Oregon's
version of the NLRA indicated that Oregon's public policy did not protect agricultural labor from
wrongful discharge claims). Despite the Appellant's argument in Rauda, the Oregon Appeals Court




lative act which confers substantive rights onto all workers. Oregon and
Washington, two states which have versions of the NLA incorporated
within their state codes, 16 have recently ruled that public policy provides
agricultural workers the ability to collectively bargain without the fear of
discharge.1 7 Similarities between the NLA and the NLRA will also be
discussed, as well as the role that federal preemption may play in labor
cases involving exempted classes such as agricultural workers.
Section V will focus on North Dakota, a state with a strong agricul-
tural base. North Dakota also has its own version of the NLA. 18 North
Dakota's NLA will be closely examined to determine how it can protect
agricultural laborers from employer retaliation and discharge. While
North Dakota has ruled that its NLA does not confer rights on public
employees,19 it has yet to decide the fate of agricultural workers with
regard to the Act. Thus, North Dakota courts could begin to follow the
decisions from Oregon and Washington in finding that the NLA confers
substantive rights on agricultural workers. 20
II. THE NORRIS LAGUARDIA ACT AS A VICTORY FOR LABOR
The NLA which was enacted in 1932, was a major victory for
labor. 21 It was enacted primarily to limit the use of judicial injunctions
which were often used by courts to limit workers' strikes and collective
action. 22 The NLA not only restricts the use of judicial injunctions
in labor disputes, but also provides workers with much needed protec-
tion in collective bargaining activities. 23 The NLA grants workers the
freedom of association, organization, and representation and protects
16. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 662.010-.130 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.32.011-.020 (West
1990) (enacting versions of the federal NLA); see also THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1095 (Patrick
Hardin eds., 3d ed. 1992) (identifying those states with versions of the NLA incorporated within their
state codes as being: Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
17. See Rauda, 935 P.2d at 473-74 (holding that agricultural workers have a cause of action
under the state's NLA); Bravo, 888 P.2d at 155 (deciding that the state's NLA confers actionable
rights to agricultural workers).
18. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 34-08-01 to -14 (1987 & Supp. 1997).
19. See City of Minot v. Gen. Drivers & Helpers Union No. 74, 142 N.W.2d 612, 617 (N.D.
1966) (holding that the state's NLA does not apply to striking public employees).
20. See Rauda, 935 P.2d at 473; Bravo, 888 P.2d at 155 (interpreting the NLA as giving
substantive rights to agricultural workers).
21. See PHILIP TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 414 (1964) (describing the
enactment of the NLA as "an outstanding legislative victory").
22. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 4 (describing the widespread use of the judicial injunction);
see also FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 90-91 (1930) (describing
judicial injunctions as restraining workers and their supporters).
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (declaring public policy to include the worker's right to collective
action without the fear of retaliatory discharge).
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them from employer retaliation or discharge. 24 However, these liberties
came after years of judicial intervention in labor disputes, which left
workers, already weakened from the Depression, in need of protective
legislation. 25
A. JUDICIAL INJUNCTIONS AND THE NEED FOR GREATER WORKER
PROTECTION
At the time of the NLA's enactment in 1932, workers were often
prevented from improving their working conditions because of the wide-
spread use of judicial injunctions, which viewed any combination of wor-
kers as an unlawful conspiracy and a threat to commerce. 26 The use of
judicial injunctions had its roots in anti-trust legislation which emerged
in America around the turn of the century. 27 The Sherman Antitrust
Act, enacted in 1890, made any attempt at restricting interstate com-
merce illegal. 28 In Loewe v. Lawlor,29 the United States Supreme Court
held that a boycott by the United Hatters of North America obstructed
the flow of the employer's product, thereby violating the Sherman Act.30
After Loewe, it became clear that any collective worker action would
invoke judicial injunctions under the Sherman Act since such action
would inevitably impact some aspect of interstate commerce. 31
Shortly after Loewe was decided, Congress enacted the Clayton Act
in 1914.32 The Clayton Act was intended to restrain the use of judicial
injunctions which were so prevalent after the Loewe decision.33 However,
24. See id. (describing the freedoms of workers to collectively bargain).
25. See 73 CONG. REC. 4474, 4502 (1932) (describing the "cruelty of the injunction" as a reason
for supporting the passage of the NLA).
26. Section 1 of the Sherman Act states: "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." See ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15)
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994); see also Nat'l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. N.L.R.B., 386 U.S. 612, 620 (1967)
(discussing how injunctions were often issued to prevent workers from organizing).
27. See Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7).
28. See 15 U.S.C. § I (declaring that every combination and conspiracy which restrained trade
was illegal).
29. 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
30. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 308-09 (1908). The Loewe case was known as the "Dan-
bury Hatters' Case," since the location of the events in Danbury, Connecticut, involved a strike and a
boycott by the Hatters' Union attempting to gain union recognition by D.E. Loewe & Company. Id. at
305; see also TAFr, supra note 2 1, at 411-14 (discussing the events surrounding the Loewe decision).
31. See Nat'l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. N.L.R.B., 386 U.S. 612, 620 (1967). The Court stated
that "[f]ederal court injunctions [were] freely issued against all manner of strikes and boycotts under
rulings that condemned virtually every collective activity of labor as unlawful restraint of trade."
32. The Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1994)). The Clayton Act was described by organized labor to be the "industrial Magna Carta." See
SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 5-6 (describing the reaction of organized labor to the enactment of the
Clayton Act).
33. Section 20 of the Clayton Act prohibited injunctions "in any case between an employer and
employees . . . involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment,
512
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despite its intentions the Clayton Act's effectiveness was limited by
subsequent judicial decisions. 34
For instance, in 1921, in Duplex Printing Press Company v. Deer-
ing,35 the Supreme Court issued an injunction against workers who were
engaged in a secondary boycott against their employer's products. 36
The Court reasoned that despite the Clayton Act's protections, the
workers' actions obstructed the company's flow of production and were
therefore a violation of the Sherman Act.37 While the Clayton Act
contained a policy statement, 38 granting workers a vague sense of worth,
it came to be limited in its application, as evidenced by the Duplex
decision. 39
In 1927, in the case of Bedford Cut Stone Company v. Journeyman
Stone Cutters' Association,40 the Supreme Court again held the collective
actions of workers to be a violation of the Sherman Act, despite the
protective provisions of the Clayton Act. 4 1 The Supreme Court deter-
mined that the Clayton Act did not shield workers who engaged in
"unlawful" acts, such as a secondary boycott, even if the acts were done
unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property right." See ch. 323, § 20,
38 Stat. 738 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 20, repealed by Pub. L. No. 101-588, § 3, 104 Stat. 2880 (1990));
see generally Bodine Produce, Inc. v. United Farm Workers Org. Comm., 494 F.2d 541, 545-46 (9th
Cir. 1974) (discussing the historical events surrounding the Loewe decision and eventual enactment of
the Clayton Act); FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, supra note 22, at 9 (depicting the history of Loewe v.
Lawlor and the events leading up to the enactment of the Clayton Act).
34. See generally Bedford Cut Stone Co. v Journeyman Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927);
Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (holding that the Clayton Act did not prohibit judicial injunctions
against workers' actions). The Supreme Court justified the judicial injunctions by constructing a limit-
ed interpretation of Section 20 by holding that the Clayton Act did not protect labor unions as parties
"to a 'dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment,' which proximately affects only a few
of them." See, eg., Duplex Printing Press, 254 U.S. at 472 (limiting § 20 of the Clayton Act).
35. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
36. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443,478-79 (1921). The Supreme Court in
Deering was the first court to issue an injunction against the workers, thereby reversing the lower
courts' decisions. See id. at 461,479.
37. Id.
38. Section 6 of the Clayton Act reads:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of
labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual aid
and help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain
individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate
objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or
construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the
antitrust laws.
See ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 17).
39. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 6 (discussing the limits placed on the application of the Clay-
ton Act by rendering actions against outside companies, such as in the case of a secondary boycott, as
being violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and thus outside of the Clayton Act's protection).
40. 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
41. See Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37, 50(1927) (ruling
that § 20 of the Clayton Act was not intended to legalize secondary boycotts).
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in furtherance of lawful goals. 42 Therefore, the Clayton Act afforded the
Journeyman Stone Cutters' Association no protection, since the Supreme
Court enjoined their secondary boycott as a violation of the Sherman
Act 43
As seen in the Bedford Cut Stone Company decision, employers
continued to seek the use of the judicial injunction to curtail workers'
collective activity, despite the enactment of the Clayton Act. 44 Judicial
interpretations of the Sherman Act continued to defeat workers' attempts
to organize themselves. 45 Therefore, the judicial injunction remained a
readily available tool for the employer to use against any collective
action on the part of workers.46
B. THE DEPRESSION AND ORGANIZED LABOR
The Depression exacerbated labor's problems because union efforts
were focused on mass unemployment and relief. 47 There was such high
unemployment at the time, 48 that many urban dwellers were forced to
seek work outside the cities in the agricultural sector. 49 However, the
situation in urban areas was no better, since the unemployed workers
who stayed in the cities often staged marches and protests demanding
relief in the form of food, medical care, and relief from eviction. 50 Thus,
42. See id. at 55 (deciding that the means used by the union did not justify the lawful ends).
43. Id.
44. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 4-7 (discussing the widespread use of judicial injunctions
against labor activity despite the enactment of the Clayton Act).
45. See id. at 4 (describing the application of the Sherman Act by the courts).
46. See id. at 6-7 (detailing the Supreme Court's use of the judicial injunction against unions
despite the enactment of the Clayton Act).
47. It is estimated that in 1932 only four million people were receiving relief, which usually con-
sisted of food items. See FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR 66 (1971)
(estimating this figure to be only a small percentage of those who needed relief). An adult person may
have been able to receive $2.00 per week, couples may have received $3.60 per week, and children
16 and older received $1.25 per week. Younger children received $0.75 per week along with some
milk. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST YOUNG MAN 354 (1974) (detailing the weekly relief figures
available to individuals during the Depression). See generally STUART MARSHALL JAMIESON, LABOR
UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 16 (1945) (describing the weakened conditions of America's
labor unions); TAFT, supra note 2 1, at 411-14 (detailing the efforts of unions to provide adequate relief
to workers).
48. In August of 1931, unemployment was estimated at eight million workers. See PIVEN & C LOW-
ARD, supra note 47, at 51 (describing government efforts to deal with the masses of unemployed work-
ers). This figure rose to more than 12 million workers by March of 1933. See TAFT, supra note 21, at
416 (identifying the problem of unemployment as a reason for the New Deal legislation).
49. See JAMIESON, supra note 47, at 15 (explaining that during the early Depression years, the
usual trend of the labor pool moving from rural parts of the country to urban centers, due to higher
wages and better conditions, was no longer the case mainly because of the shortage of work in the
nation's cities).
50. Evictions during this time were frequent and were often met with "rent riots," masses of
people retuming the furniture of evicted families back into their homes. In addition to these protests
over evictions, groups of the unemployed, often led by members of the Communist Party, marched
through cities like Washington, D.C., to demand relief from the disastrous conditions prevailing at the
time. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 47, at 61-66 (describing the efforts of the unemployed to call
514
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union membership in most industries, including membership within the
agricultural industry, declined during this period. 51
C. THE NORRIS LAGUARDIA ACT AND THE FREEDOM TO ORGANIZE
Due to the judicial maneuvering around the Clayton Act, and the
further proliferation of judicial injunctions, as well as the economic
effects of the Depression, it became apparent that existing legislation was
no match for the problems faced by workers of all industries.5 2 The
American Federation of Labor (AFL),53 addressed some of the problems,
including advocating legislation that would curb the use of the wide-
spread judicial injunction.54 The AFL endorsed such a bill as early as
1928,55 and continued to strongly promote the idea until it was again
considered by Congress in 1931.56
In an effort to persuade the Senate to pass such an anti-injunction
bill, Senator Norris of Nebraska spoke of the 389 injunctions that had
been issued in federal and state courts against workers from
1922-1932.57 Many of these injunctions not only prohibited workers
from collective action such as striking and boycotting, but often forbade
workers from warning others that companies operated with "yellow dog
contracts."58
attention to their poverty through political action).
51. In particular during 1930 through 1933 when the Depression was at its worst, strikes taking
place on farms lessened considerably. See JAMIESON, supra note 47, at 16-17. The number of farm
workers participating in strikes in 1930 was approximately 8,600, which dropped to around 3,200
in 1932. See id. (providing figures for the number of strikes taking place within the American
agricultural sector prior to 1933).
52. See 73 CONG. REC. 4502, in which Senator Norris of Nebraska, one of the sponsors of the
NLA, stated in a speech to the Senate that the use of the injunction had been used to repress workers'
constitutional rights, rather than to simply protect employers' property interests as the Clayton Act
required.
53. The American Federation of Labor was founded in 1886. See J. DAVID G REENSTONE, LABOR
IN AMERICAN POLITICS 30 (Hugh Douglas Price consulting ed., 1969) (discussing the history of the
AFL).
54. See TAFT, supra note 21, at 414 (indicating that a version of an anti-injunction bill was first
introduced in 1927 by Senator Henrik Shipstead at the request of the AFL).
55. Id. While the bill failed to get sufficient votes for passage, the idea continued to gain popu-
larity and was adopted in both the Republican and Democratic party platforms of the 1928 conven-
tions. See id. at 414-15.
56. Id. at 415. The NLA was subsequently signed into law on March 23, 1932. See id.
57. See 73 CONG. REC. 4474, 4508 (1932).
58. A "yellow dog contract" is "[a]n employment practice by which an employer requires em-
ployee to sign an agreement promising as condition of employment that he will not join a union, and
will be discharged if he does join." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1616 (6th ed. 1990). See Hitchman
Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 248, 250-51 (1917), in which the Supreme Court upheld the
"yellow dog contract" by applying an injunction to a labor dispute prohibiting the United Mine
Workers of America from organizing workers who had signed such contracts. For a discussion of the
Hitchman Coal case, see TAFT, supra note 21, at 361-62 (discussing the impact of the Hitchman Coal
decision upon the use of such contracts); see also FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 22, at 148-49
(discussing the widespread use of the "yellow dog contract"). Often if a worker refused to sign such
a contract for one company, he left only to encounter them elsewhere. See 73 CONG. REC. 4504
(testimony of Senator Norris indicating that the use of the "yellow dog contract" was in some instances
industry-wide).
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In 1932, under the administration of President Herbert Hoover, 59
the anti-injunction bill known as the Norris LaGuardia Act was en-
acted.60 Specifically, the NLA prohibits the use of injunctions in labor
disputes,6 1 outlaws the "yellow dog contract" 62 and contains a public
policy statement which officially legitimizes the freedom of all workers
to collectively bargain without the threat of retaliatory discharge by
employers. 63 The Supreme Court gave the NLA substantive effect in
59. See TAFT, supra note 21, at 415 (noting that the NLA was signed by President Herbert Hoover
on March 23, 1932).
60. See ch. 90, §§ 1-15, 47 Stat. 70-73 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15
(1994)). See TAFT, supra note 21, at 415 (indicating that the Act passed overwhelmingly with 363 of
376 votes in the House of Representatives and 75 of 80 votes in the Senate). For a legislative history
regarding the NLA, see Bodine Produce, Inc. v. United Farm Workers Org. Comm., 494 F.2d 541, 548
n. 16 (citing 73 CONG REC. 4502-11, 4618-30, 4676-96, 4754-61, 4914-20, 4927-39).
61. Section 1 of the NLA states:
No court of the United States, as defined in this chapter, shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute, except in strict conformity with the provisions of this
chapter, nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be
issued contrary to the public policy declared in this chapter.
47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 101).
62. Section 3 of the NLA states:
Any undertaking or promise . . . is declared to be contrary to the public policy of the
United States, shall not be enforceable in any court of the United States . . . [e]very
undertaking or promise hereafter made, whether written or oral, express or implied,
constituting or contained in any contract or agreement of hiring or employment between
any individual, firm, company, association, or corporation, and any employee or
prospective employee of the same, whereby,[e]ither party to such contract or agreement
undertakes or promises not to join, become, or remain a member of any labor
organization or of any employer organization; or (e]ither party to such contract or
agreement undertakes or promises that he will withdraw from an employment relation in
the event that he joins, becomes, or remains, a member of any labor organization or of
any employer organization.
47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 103).
63. Section 2 of the NLA states:
In the interpretation of this chapter and in determining the jurisdiction and authority of
the courts of the United States, as such jurisdiction and authority are defined and limited
to this chapter, the public policy of the United States is declared as follows:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of
governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate
and other forms of ownership associations, the individual unorganized
worker, is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to
protect his freedom of labor, and thereby obtain acceptable terms and
conditions of employment, wherefor, though he should be free to decline to
associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own
choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that
he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of
labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in
self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purposes of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; therefore, the
following definitions of and limitations upon the jurisdiction and authority of
the courts of the United States are enacted.
47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 102) (emphasis added).
516
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1938 in Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co.64 In Lauf, the Court held that an
injunction had been improperly issued because the district court over-
stepped its jurisdictional limits set by the NLA.65 In effect, the Lauf
Court required district courts to look to the NLA and determine whether
"irreparable injury to complainants' property" would result from the
ensuing labor dispute, before issuing a judicial injunction. 66 Since the
district court in Lauf made no determinations under the NLA, its
injunction against the union was improper. 67
Similarly, another case from 1938 gave unions protection from
judicial injunctions under the NLA. In New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary
Grocery Co., Inc.,68 the Supreme Court broadened the application of the
NLA by holding that the NLA protected workers in protesting racial
discrimination in the workplace. 69 In New Negro Alliance, a union of
African-American workers picketed their employer because it refused to
hire African-Americans in certain locations. 70 The Court held that the
NLA protected the union in its protest of the racially discriminatory
hiring policy. 7 I Therefore, the NLA was given substantive effect by the
Court in terms of limiting judicial injunctions and protecting the
workers' right to organize. 72
III. THE AGRICULTURAL EXEMPTION: FROM LIKELY
EXCLUSION TO ABSOLUTE EXEMPTION-THE NATIONAL
INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT AND THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT
In order to fully understand the need for the NLA as a means for
farm workers to collectively bargain, it is necessary to consider the
exclusion of farm labor from other legislation, such as the NLRA73 and
the FLSA.74 Exclusion of farm workers from labor legislation began in
1933 with the enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA).75 There was uncertainty in terms of whether agricultural wor-
64. 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
65. See Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938) (determining that the district court
exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing an injunction).
66. Id. at 329.
67. Id.
68. 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
69. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 561 (1938).
70. Id. at 559.
71. See id. at 561 (holding that the NLA protected workers in protesting an employer's racially
discriminatory hiring policies).
72. See id. at 563 (interpreting the NLA as protecting workers' rights to publicly express dissatis-
faction with employment conditions and to "peacefully ... persuade others to concur in their views").
73. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994) (exempting agricultural labor).
74. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) (1994) (exempting agricultural labor).
75. See ch. 90, §§ 1-10, 48 Stat. 195-200 (1933) [hereinafter NIRA] (held unconstitutional in
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kers were included under the NIRA.76 While agricultural workers were
not expressly excluded from the NIRA, they were usually regarded as
falling outside of the NIRA's provisions.77
The uncertainty regarding the possible exclusion of farm labor
from the NIRA ended when the NIRA was declared unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court in 1935.78 However, the NIRA is thought to be the
beginning of the farm worker exemption. 79 This exclusion was formal-
ized with the enactment of the NLRA and FLSA and continues today.80
A. THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT AND THE BEGINNING OF
EXCLUSION
Along with the passage of the NLA in 1932, the NIRA and the
Agricultural Adjustment Act, (AAA)81 were enacted in 1933. Unlike the
NLA which limited judicial injunctions, the NIRA and the AAA were
enacted in order to revive a failing economy. 82 The NIRA further
helped industrial workers by reducing unfair competition and limiting
restrictions on commerce by setting up industry codes and regulating
wages and hours. 8 3 These codes were enforced by the National Recovery
Administration (NRA).84 Like the NLA, the NIRA contained a policy
statement which further sanctioned labor's ability to unionize.85
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
76. See Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial Discrimination in
the New Deal, 65 TEx. L. REV. 1335, 1356 (1987) (describing the inter-agency conflict regarding
coverage of farm workers under the NIRA).
77. See id. (stating that the practical effects of administrative interpretations of the NIRA usually
resulted in farm labor exemptions).
78. See generally A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. 495.
79. See Linder, supra note 76, at 1356.
80. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3); 213(a)(6) (1994) (exempting agricultural workers from the NLRA
and the FLSA).
81. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 [hereinafter AAA), ch. 25, §§ 1-19, 48 Stat. 31-41
(1933) (held unconstitutional in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)). See Edward L. Schaps-
meier & Frederick H. Schapsmeier, Farm Labor Policy from FDR to Eisenhower: Southern Demo-
crats and the Politics of Agriculture, 53 AGRIc. HtST. 352, 359 (1979) (discussing the subsequent
passage of the AAA of 1938).
82. See TAFT, supra note 21, at 416 (examining President Roosevelt's contention that there was a
need for legislation that would provide for industrial recovery). Other legislation passed during Roose-
velt's first months in office included: the Emergency Banking Act, the Economy Act, the Civilian
Conservation Corps., the Federal Emergency Relief Act, the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, the
Truth-in- Securities Act, the Home Owners Loan Act, the Glass-Steagall Banking Act, the Farm Credit
Act, and the Railroad Coordination Act. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 47, at 71 (describing the
legislation resulting from the economic collapse faced by Roosevelt's newly elected administration).
83. See GREENSTONE, supra note 53, at 46-47 (detailing legislation such as the NIRA which was
enacted to regulate hours, wages and working conditions); see also TAFT, supra note 21, at 416
(describing the NIRA's objectives to include the freedom of commerce and an end to unregulated
competition).
84. See Linder, supra note 76, at 1354 (describing the NRA's authorization to enforce the
NIRA's provisions).
85. Section 7 of the NIRA states:
[t]hat employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or
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The NIRA's provisions providing legal protection for workers' col-
lective action led to a dramatic upsurge in union activity. 86 For instance,
in 1933, sixty-one strikes involving agricultural workers occurred in
seventeen states. 87 The agricultural sector had, until then, only seen a
few localized unions which declined even further during the early years
of the Depression. 88
Despite the victory that industrial workers felt about the passage of
the NIRA,89 it remained uncertain whether agricultural workers were
entitled to its protection. 90 This is because the NRA interpreted the
NIRA to regulate only industrial relations. 91 In addition, agricultural
interests were believed to be enforced by the AAA, thus giving the NRA
little jurisdiction to regulate agricultural labor.92 The AAA's goal was to
raise farm income, however, and it had the interests of farmers, rather
than the interests of farm workers, in mind.93 Therefore, agricultural
workers, presumably covered by neither the NIRA nor the AAA, were
left unprotected by early New Deal legislation. 94
As seen by the increase in agricultural strikes, however, this
exclusion was not always clear to the agricultural industry. Caught up in
the general increase of union organizing, many agricultural workers
proposed fair competition "codes" similar to those done for other
coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives
in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection.
§ 7(a)(l), 48 Stat. 195 (1933); see also TAFT, supra note 21, at 416 (indicating that § 7 of the NIRA,
like § 2 of the NLA, affirmed workers' right to organize and the freedom from retaliation by em-
ployers should workers exercise this right, or to refrain from joining a company union). The NIRA
was declared unconstitutional in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
86. Workers were reported to be joining unions in the tens and hundreds of thousands as indi-
cated by the words of the AFL: "Hundreds of thousands of workers-more than 200,000 in the United
Mine Workers alone-have been enrolled in the past two months in international unions and local
unions directly affiliated with the American Federation of Labor." See TAFT, supra note 21, at 419.
87. These various strikes involved approximately 56,800 workers. See JAMIESON, supra note 47,
at 16 (indicating that 56,800 workers took part in 61 strikes occurring in 17 states around the country in
1933). Reasons for this increase in activity include low wages paid to farm workers along with the
perception that other industries were being advantaged by this legislation. See id. at 17.
88. See id. at 16 (listing the number of strikes in the agricultural sector during the 1930s).
89. In the words of the AFL: "For the first time in the history of the nation there has been written
in a statute passed by the Congress of the United States a section according workers a legal right to
organize and to be protected in the exercise of that right." See TAFT supra note 21, at 420 (discussing
a release by the AFL to workers regarding the passage of the NIRA).
90. See Linder, supra note 76, at 1354 (describing the NIRA to be an "industrial recovery act"
from which agricultural labor was excluded); see also JAMIESON, supra note 47, at 17 (contending that
the NIRA and the AAA gave benefits to particular occupations, including farm owners, growers, and
industrial laborers, while excluding farm workers).
91. See Linder, supra note 76, at 1356 (describing the NRA as an agency which thought itself to
regulate industry only).
92. See id.
93. See Schapsmeier & Schapsmeier, supra note 81, at 359 (detailing the goal of the AAA as
raising farm income by restricting total output).
94. See Linder, supra note 76, at 1359 (identifying administrative conflicts between the NIRA
and AAA as resulting in exclusion of much farm labor from legislative protection).
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industries under the NIRA.95 However, the NIRA was created primarily
for the benefit of industrial workers. 96 Thus, while agricultural labor was
not expressly excluded, it was generally thought to lie outside of the
NIRA's provisions. 97 While the NIRA was declared unconstitutional
before the issue was ultimately decided,98 it should nonetheless be
considered to be the beginning of the agricultural labor exemption. 99
B. THE NLRA AND THE FORMALIZATION OF THE FARM LABOR
EXEMPTION
By 1935, with the passage of the NLRA, agricultural labor was
expressly excluded from the protection provided to the industrial work-
force.100 The enactment of the FLSA, in 1938, led to the implemen-
tation of the agricultural exemption, which excluded agricultural workers
from receiving the benefits of hour and wage protections.'O' One pro-
posed reason for the utilization of these exemptions has to do with the
political compromise by the southern block in securing an exemption
for much of its workforce.102 In addition, Congress seemed reluctant
to regulate the agricultural sector which was thought to be more local-
ized than other industries. 103 Thus New Deal legislation, while further
legitimizing the strength of the industrial worker, expressly left the
agricultural worker with little additional protection.
95. See JAMIESON, supra note 47, at 18 n.4 (citing the ignorance of the NIRA's provisions, and the
upsurge in overall union activity as the reasons why codes were sent to the National Recovery
Administration (hereinafter NRA) from farm workers)).
96. See Linder, supra note 76, at 1356 (describing the NRA's interpretation of the NIRA as apply-
ing only to industrial labor) (citing R. WOODBURY, LIMITS OF COVERAGE OF LABOR IN INDUSTRIES CLOSELY
ALLIED TO AGRICULTURE UNDER CODES OF FAIR C OMPETITION UNDER N IRA 4 (1936)); see also Maurice
Jourdane, The Constitutionality of the NLRA Farm Labor Exemption, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 384, 386 (1968)
(citing the NIRA as covering industrial workers).
97. See generally Linder, supra note 76, at 1356-61 (describing the administrative confusion be-
tween the NIRA and the AAA, which often resulted in the agricultural sector declaring itself to lie
outside of the NIRA's jurisdiction).
98. Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (held unconstitutional in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
99. "Congress did not intend that codes of fair competition under the NIRA be set up for farmers
or persons engaged in agricultural production." See Linder, supra note 76, at 1356 (citing WOODBURY,
supra note 96, at 3).
100. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994) (refusing to include agricultural workers within the NLRA's
definition of "employee").
101. See FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1994) (exempting agricultural workers from wage and hour
provisions).
102. See Linder, supra note 76, at 1372 (describing the need for appeasement of southern
legislators in order to ensure the passage of the FLSA).




The NLRA legitimized labor's ability to collectively bargain.' 0 4
The NLRA contains the same protections for labor that the previous
NIRA contained, by declaring that the worker has a "right" to organ-
ize1 05 and to be protected from employer retaliation for exercising that
right.' 06 Even with the enactment of the NIRA, workers continued to
struggle for their rights to organize. 107 Therefore, the NLRA provided
for an administrative body, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
which would oversee and enforce its provisions.108
Unfortunately, this legislative victory had little regard for agricultur-
al workers, as they were expressly left out of its coverage.' 0 9 This exclu-
sion cannot be attributed to a lack of need on behalf of farm workers." 0
104. Section 7 of the NLRA legislatively confirmed workers' rights to organize. See TAFt, supra
note 21, at 416 (quoting language from § 7 of the Act stating, "that employees shall have the right to
organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing").
105. Section 7 of the NLRA is as follows:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in
section 158(a)(3) of this title.
49 Stat. 452 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994)).
106. Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act states that it:
[sihall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 157 of this title...
to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges
or given testimony under this subchapter . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees ....
49 Stat. 452 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 US.C. § 158(a)(1), (4) (1994 & West Supp. 1998)).
107. Three strikes which were instrumental during this period and indicative of workers' con-
tinued struggle for recognition are the San Francisco general strike by the Pacific Coast Longshore-
men, the Minneapolis general strike by the truckers, and the Toledo Electric Auto-Lite Company strike
in Toledo, Ohio. While all three strikes were considered successful, each was met with violent opposi-
tion by companies. For descriptions and accounts of these strikes, see GREENSTONE, supra note 53, at
42; TAFT, supra note 21, at 435-49.
108. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a), (b) (1994) (creating the NLRB to oversee the provisions of the
NLRA).
109. Section 2 of the NLRA states:
The term "employee" shall include any employee ... and shall include any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor
dispute or because of any unfair labor practice .... but shall not include any individual
employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at
his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having
the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or
any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended
from time to time, or by any person who is not an employer as herein defined.
49 Stat. 450 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994)).
110. Unfortunately, not all courts realized this need. In North Whittier Heights Citrus Ass'n v.
N.L.R.B., 109 F.2d 76, 80 (9th Cir. 1940), the court indicated that agricultural workers, along with
domestic servants, and persons employed by family members were exempt from the NLRA because
all three groups had a "common denominator." The court interpreted this common trait to mean that
these groups should have no difficulty in negotiating with employers, thus rendering the need for
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For instance, in an effort to include agricultural labor in the bill's pro-
visions, Representative Marcantonio of New York called attention to the
plight of agricultural labor and testified on the United States House of
Representatives floor that farm workers endure the worst conditions in
the nation. 1I1
Similarly, attempts by agricultural workers to unionize were often
met with violence and imprisonment of workers and workers' advocates
by growers' associations and local law enforcement. 112 Containing the
unionization of workers was often easily achieved due to the specific
problems facing the farm labor work force, which include its migratory
nature, its low social position, its lack of political power, and the fact that
it was often composed of poorer immigrants.1 3 Thus, even in 1935 with
collective bargaining rights minimal. Id. However, even taking this interpretation into account, the
court stated that due to the growth of the agricultural industry (particularly the citrus industry as in this
case) from the small farmer into large-scale industry, this "common denominator has ceased to exist."
Id. Therefore, even accepting the argument that collective bargaining rights for agricultural workers
were not as relevant at the time of the enactment of the NLRA, this need has become more urgent
with the increasingly corporate and impersonal nature of the business. See id. (discussing the fact that
through the growth of the citrus industry and the increasingly impersonal nature of the business, the
need for collective bargaining may also become more important); see also Jourdane, supra note 96, at
392 (citing Hearings on S. 1000, S. 1264, S. 1392, S. 1550, S. 1580, and S. 2123 Before the Senate
Comm. on Education and Labor, 76th Cong. 3638-39 (1939). This included the testimony of Ivan
McDaniel, which expressed the romantic view that farm workers did not need collective bargaining
rights because "[t]he worker and the farmer ... eat at a common table, their children attend the same
schools, they bow down together in religious worship").
11. See 79 CONG. REC. 9668, 9720 (1935) (recounting the statement of Representative Vito Mar-
cantonio). Marcantonio gave further testimony regarding the struggle of the Southern Tenant Farmers
Union in Arkansas and the violent reactions that accompanied their attempts to organize. Id. Repre-
sentative Marcantonio was one of the few legislators at the time to express consistent concern with the
plight of agricultural workers and to advocate on their behalf. See Austin P. Morris, Agricultural
Labor and National Labor Legislation, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1939, 1951 n.55 (1966) (indicating that despite
having an urban constituency, Representative Marcantonio was in favor of including agricultural
workers within the NLRA); see also JAnMIESON supra note 47, at 39 (describing annual wages in the
agricultural sector to be some of the lowest among the general work force).
112. See JAMIESON, supra note 47 at 39-42 (discussing the violence and intimidation experienced
by agricultural workers in their attempts to strike); see also Labor Disputes Act: Hearing on H.R. 6288
Before the House of Representatives Comm. on Labor, 74th Cong. 2501-25 (1935) (giving the testi-
mony of James Rorty, a newspaper reporter, who was called before the House Committee for testi-
mony regarding his harassment, imprisonment, and final expulsion from the Imperial Valley in Ari-
zona by local law enforcement as he attempted to report on striking lettuce shed workers). Rorty
indicated that the attempt of the union was to enforce a strike settlement that had been entered into in
neighboring Salinas Valley in the previous year. Id. at 2516. The union was attempting to enforce the
settlement in the Imperial Valley, since it concerned the identical work force (which had since
migrated to the Imperial Valley), and the same union. Id.
113. For instance, in addition to the other problems faced by agricultural laborers as a whole,
many southern farm workers at this time were not able to vote due to the racial laws that were still in
effect. See JAMIESON, supra note 47, at 39 (discussing the difficulties of southern agricultural workers




the enactment of the NLRA, farm workers were in need of protective
legislation.114
C. REASONS FOR THE AGRICULTURAL EXEMPTION
Some argue that one reason for the agricultural exemption from the
NLRA and FLSA is political."1 5 In short, without the agricultural exemp-
tion, the powerful southern Democratic block threatened to derail Presi-
dent Roosevelt's New Deal legislation. 116 It may also be argued that the
agricultural exemption was premised on Constitutional grounds, specifi-
cally regarding congressional commerce power. 117 Finally, the unique-
ness of agricultural labor may have provided concern regarding the
necessity of agricultural labor's inclusion within New Deal legislation."l 8
These three reasons proved to be fatal for farm worker protection."19
1. The Agricultural Exemption in Political Perspective
The power that the southern block maintained during the time of
the New Deal has been well documented.120 The South had mainly an
agricultural economy that was built on the exploitation of cheap black
labor.121 New Deal legislation, particularly the FLSA which regulated
114. Congressman Marcantonio of New York offered an amendment to the NLRA as it was
being debated on the House floor that would include agricultural workers within its provisions, stating,
"[t]he same reasons urged for the adoption of this bill on behalf of the industrial workers are equally
applicable in the case of the agricultural workers, in fact more so as their plight calls for immediate
and prompt action." 79 CONG. REC. 9668, 9720 (1935).
115. See generally Jim Chen, OfAgriculture's First Disobedience and Its Fruit, 48 VAND. L. REV.
1261 (1995); Linder, supra note 76.
116. See Chen, supra note 115, at 1281 (referencing Patrick M. Anderson, The Agricultural
Employee Exemption from the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 649, 652-57
(1989)).
117. The NIRA, for example, was declared to be unconstitutional as it burdened interstate com-
merce, thus creating an improper use of congressional commerce power. See A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550, 551 (1935) (holding that the NIRA was an improper
use of congressional commerce power); see also 79 CONG. R EC. 9668, 9721 (1935) (regarding the state-
ments of Representative Ellenbogen involving his concern as to whether agricultural labor fell under
the label of "interstate commerce").
118. See, eg., North Whittier Heights Citrus Ass'n v. N.L.R.B., 109 F.2d 76, 80 (9th Cir. 1949)
(describing the small farmer's relationship with the farm worker to be adequate without the need for
collective bargaining agreements). The court stated that this necessity may change as the scale of
farming grows. Id.
119. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1994) (exempting agricultural labor);
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213 (exempting agricultural labor).
120. See Schapsmeier & Schapsmeier, supra note 81, at 354 (explaining that at times the southern
block became even more powerful due to its alliance with the midwestern wheat belt); see also
GREENSTONE, supra note 53, at 48 (noting that despite the strength of the southern Democratic block,
labor's interests were nonetheless served by Congress rather than by Roosevelt); see generally Linder,
supra note 76, at 1351-53 (discussing the role of southern Democrats on New Deal policies and the
need for their cooperation to see legislation through).
121. See Linder, supra note 76, at 1343 (describing the South as the only part of the nation with
an agricultural economy); see also Chen, supra note 115, at 1274-87 (discussing southern agriculture
and the role that slavery and black labor played in its maintenance).
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wages and hours, endangered this economic power structure.12 2 The
New Deal, at least to the southern legislator, worsened the tensions be-
tween the North and South,123 and sought to rid the South of its racially
defined economic system.12 4
In order to placate this powerful block of legislators, the exclusion
of agricultural labor from these New Deal policies was offered as a
compromise to the otherwise labor-friendly legislation of the time. 12 5
This exemption excluded much of the southern labor force from
enforcement of New Deal legislation, particularly with respect to the
wage and hour provisions of the FLSA. 126 Therefore, the exclusion of
agricultural labor from the FLSA was a compromise designed at least in
part to ensure its passage.127
122. See Linder, supra note 76, at 1342-53 (discussing the opposition by the southern block to
New Deal legislation, particularly regarding the FLSA which regulated wages and hours for workers,
as a threat to the southern plantation system); GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, THE EMERGENCE OFTHE NEW
SOUTH 618 (Wendell Holmes Stephenson & E. Merton Coulter eds., 1967) (discussing the effect of
New Deal policies such as the NIRA on the existing racially-based power structure in the South).
123. See TINDALL, supra note 122, at 618-19 (discussing the "[n]orthernization" of the Demo-
cratic party following the passage of New Deal legislation such as the FLSA, the NLRA and social
security, which worsened the tensions between northern and southern legislators).
124. See Linder, supra note 76, at 1342-43 (identifying the New Deal as a threat to the southern
economic system); see also Chen, supra note 115, at 1281 (describing the FLSA as contradicting the
southern reliance on inexpensive black labor).
125. See Chen, supra note 115, at 1281 (discussing the compromise made by southern Democrats
with settling for the agricultural exemption to FLSA since they were unable to completely prevent the
bill's passage (referencing Linder, supra note 76, at 1371-75 (regarding this compromise)).
126. See Chen, supra note 115, at 1281 (noting that the agricultural exemption to the FLSA would
include much of the South's labor force); see also Linder, supra note 76, at 1344 (describing farm
workers as constituting a larger population in the South as compared to other regions of the country).
127. See Chen, supra note 115, at 1281 (noting that southerners compromised since they were un-
able to completely prevent the FLSA's passage through Congress). However, with regard to collec-
tive bargaining rights, there is evidence to suggest that at least some members of Congress did not
intend for the agricultural exemption to last indefinitely. 79 CONG. REC. 9721. In response to a pro-
posed amendment which would include agricultural labor within the provisions of the NLRA, Congress-
man Connery of Massachusetts replied that he supported the agricultural exemption simply in order
that the bill not attempt too much in its initial phase. He stated:
We hope that the agricultural workers eventually will be taken care of. I might say to
my friend from New York [Marcantonio] at this point, certainly I am in favor of giving
the agricultural workers every protection, but just now I believe in biting off one
mouthful at a time. If we can get this bill through and get it working properly, there will
be opportunity later, and I hope soon, to take care of the agricultural workers.
Id.
Congressman Connery was not the only legislator who held such beliefs. During this same debate
for instance, Representative Ellenbogen, in response to Representative Marcantonio's statement that
farm workers should be included in the bill stated, "I personally believe that the agricultural workers
should have all the protection we can give them." Id. Although Representative Ellenbogen questioned
Representative Marcantonio's amendment with regards to congressional power in regulating the
activity of interstate commerce, under whose jurisdiction the NLRA was to come, his beliefs that




The agricultural exemption from the NLRA and FLSA was also
possibly the result of congressional concerns regarding the constitution-
ality of its commerce power.' 28 The recent rulings of the Supreme Court
invalidating the NIRA on commerce grounds,129 caused some members
of Congress to be concerned about the constitutionality of the NLRA
with respect to congressional commerce power.130 Some legislators
seemed reluctant to regulate agriculture, because it was considered to be
a local concern. 131
3. The Uniqueness of Agricultural Labor
A final reason advanced in favor of the agricultural exemption from
New Deal legislation was the strong concern for the small farmer. 132
Farmers at this time were thought to employ no more than a few workers
during the season and were thought to have suffered greatly under the
economic strains of the Depression.1 33  At the time, it was thought that
128. See § I of the NLRA stating that "[i]t is declared to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce." 49 Stat. 450
(1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994)); see also 79 CONG. REC. 9721 (regarding con-
gressional concern about whether agricultural labor fell under the label of "interstate commerce").
The constitutionality of the NLRA was eventually upheld in N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
129. The NIRA had been held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1935 because the
Act was held to be an improper delegation of congressional commerce power. See A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. et al. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935). The Court held that the NIRA burdened
intrastate commerce, with only an indirect affect on interstate commerce, thus constituting an
improper use of congressional power. See id. at 550, 551 (holding that the NIRA was an improper use
of congressional commerce power).
130. See 79 CONG. REC. 9721 (regarding the concerns of Representative Ellenbogen as to whether
agricultural workers fell under the term "interstate commerce" as held by the Supreme Court).
131. See S. REP. No. 74-573, at 2306 (1935) (indicating the reluctance of Congress to regulate
local matters). This reasoning was given by one court to explain that states have the power to rule in
cases involving collective bargaining rights of agricultural labor since their exclusion from the NLRA
resulted from a congressional determination to refrain from asserting power over agricultural
workers. See N.L.R.B. v. Comm. of Interns & Residents, 566 F.2d 810, 815 n.5 (2d Cir. 1977)
(comparing excluded workers due to Congress' intention to refrain from asserting jurisdiction with
excluded workers whom Congress decided need not be entitled to the provisions of the NLRA due to
national labor policy).
132. See Morris, supra note 11, at 1970-71 (regarding the sense of concern expressed for
farmers who would be burdened without the legislative exemption of farm workers).
133. See 79 CONG. REC. 9721. Representative Boileau stated:
I grant there may be some sections of the country where it would be desirable to permit
the organization of share-croppers or tenant farmers or other types of agricultural
labor . . . [i]n some states of the Union, especially in the Middle West, the farmers
seldom employ more than one or two employees, and then for only seasonal employment.
Id. Cf. North Whittier Heights Citrus Ass'n v. N.L.R.B., 109 F.2d 76, 80 (9th Cir. 1949) (explaining that
the worker and farmer may no longer have a direct relationship due to the growth and industrialization
of the citrus industry).
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inclusion of the agricultural sector within the NLRA and FLSA could
potentially harm farmers more than industrial employers. 134 This
concern was due to the recognition that a strike of agricultural workers
would pose a particular hardship for farmers due to the perishable nature
of their crops.1 35
Thus, agricultural workers were excluded from New Deal legislation
for a variety of reasons. In order to ensure protective legislation of any
kind, political compromises were made, particularly to satisfy powerful
southern legislators.1 36 Secondly, congressional concern regarding the
proper usage of commerce power may have convinced some legislators
to postpone the inclusion of agricultural workers within protective
legislation. 137 Finally, sympathy for the small farmer and the uniqueness
of the agricultural sector led some to resist the inclusion of agricultural
workers within New Deal legislation.138
IV. ALTERNATIVE ROUTES OF ADVOCACY FOR THE
AGRICULTURAL WORKER
Workers are entitled to the right to bargain collectively. 139 The
NLRA grants most workers this protection.140 The NLRA is therefore an
extension, rather than a limitation on the rights expressed in the NLA. 141
Thus, despite the exclusion of farm labor from the NLRA, agricultural
workers have alternative protection under the NLA since the NLA
affirms every worker's right on unionize. 142 Two states have ruled that
the NLA confers substantive rights to agricultural workers which protect
them from wrongful discharge and retaliation.14 3 Finally, regulation of
134. See Jourdane, supra note 96, at 397 (discussing the theory that the inclusion of farm labor
within the NLRA would harm farmers more than employers of other industries who, due to the
perishable nature of their crops, would be in a difficult situation should workers choose to strike).
135. See id.
136. See Chen, supra note 115, at 1281 (referencing Linder, supra note 76, at 1371-75).
137. See 79 CONG. REC. 9721 (depicting the statements of Congressman Connery of Massachu-
setts describing his hope that agricultural workers would eventually be given the same protections that
industrial workers were to be given under the NLRA); see also id. (regarding congressional concern
as to whether agricultural workers fell under "interstate commerce").
138. See Jourdane, supra note 96, at 393 (citing Morris, supra note 111, at 1970-72).
139. In American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921), the
Supreme Court stated that unions were not only legitimized by the Clayton Act, but were "organized
out of the necessities of the situation." The Court continued by explaining that "[a] single employee
was helpless in dealing with an employer ... [u]nion was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal
on equality with their employer ... [t]he right to combine for such a lawful purpose has in many years
not been denied in any court." Id.
140. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994) (protecting workers in their collective activity).
141. See TAFT, supra note 21, at 457 (discussing the opinion of Senator Wagner, sponsor of the
NLRA, that the Act extended the rights guaranteed by the NLA).
142. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
143. See Rauda v. Oregon Roses, Inc., 935 P.2d 469, 473 (Or. Ct. App. 1997); Bravo v. Dolsen
Cos., 888 P.2d 147, 155 (Wash. 1995) (deciding that the NLA grants farm laborers substantive rights).
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agricultural workers under state law may offer an additional alternative
despite the exemption of farm labor from the NLRA.144
A. THE NLRA DOES NOT LIMIT WORKERS' RIGHTS EXPRESSED IN THE
NORRIS LAGUARDIA ACT
Section 7 of the NLRA was modeled after the NLA and therefore
should be thought to encompass the same principles and rights. 145 The
enactment of the NLRA occurred in 1935 in an effort to strengthen and
further secure the worker's right to organize.I4 6 First, Section 7 of the
NLRA provides workers the right to collectively bargain without the fear
of discharge, as does the NLA.147 In addition, the NLRA provides for
the NLRB to oversee and enforce its provisions. 148 Therefore, the NLRA
simply strengthens worker protection afforded under the NLA.149
1. The Norris Laguardia Act, Like the NLRA, Confers
Substantive Rights on Workers
To be of any use to agricultural or industrial labor, the NLA's
public policy statement must be something more: it must be a declar-
ation that every worker has the substantive right to collective activity
without the fear of discharge.150 The Supreme Court, as early as 1938 in
Lauf v. E. G. Schinner & Company, Inc., 151 ruled that the NLA's public
policy statement defined an employer's and worker's relationship.152
144. See Willmar Poultry Co., Inc. v. Jones, 430 F.Supp. 573, 578 (D. Minn. 1977) (finding that
agricultural workers had protection under state law because the NLRA did not preempt state action).
For a discussion of federal preemption involving labor issues, see generally Stephen F. Befort,
Demystifying Federal Labor and Employment Law Preemption, 13 THE LAB. LAW. 411,429 (1998).
145. See National Labor Relations Board: Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 74th Cong. 38 (1935) (discussing the similarities between the NLA and the NLRA:
[t]he main provisions of the present bill define four unfair labor practices, and
provide suitable means of preventing them . . . The first unfair labor practice in
substance forbids an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual protection.
This language flows practically verbatim the familiar principles embedded in our law by
... Section 2 of the Norris LaGuardia Act).
146. See GREENSTONE, supra note 53, at 47 (comparing the NLRA and the NLA).
147. Compare the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157, with the NLA, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (declaring that workers
should be free to collectively bargain).
148. See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (a), (b) (1994) (creating the NLRB).
149. See TAFr, supra note 21, at 457 (discussing the opinion of Senator Wagner, sponsor of the
NLRA, that the Act was an extension of the NLA).
150. See id. (declaring that workers have the right to collectively bargain without the fear of
employer interference).
151. 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
152. Lauf v. E.G. Schinner & Co., Inc., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938). The Court in this case ruled
that the lower courts had erred by issuing an injunction prohibiting the workers from picketing the
defendant's meat market without first having looked at the provisions of the NLA. Id. at 329. The
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This was an indication that the NLA could confer substantive rights on
workers since the Court ruled that it was incorrect to disregard the
NLA's public policy statement in resolving labor disputes that were
defined by the Act. 153
However, the Supreme Court was not the first court to recognize the
substantive nature of the NLA's policy statement since this was done by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court as early as 1934.154 In Trustees of Wiscon-
sin State Federation of Labor v. Simplex Shoe Manufacturing Com-
pany, 155 the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the state's version of
the NLA156 was a "deliberate declaration" of the rights to which work-
ers were entitled.1 57 The court stated that "[t]o hold otherwise would
amount to saying that the Legislature did not intend what it said, but
merely intended to write into the statutes language pleasing to labor." 158
Thus, two years after its enactment, Wisconsin's NLA was held to substan-
tively grant workers the power to act together in trying to improve their
working conditions without fear of retaliation by their employer.159
The next case which sought to confer substantive rights to non-
agricultural workers through the NLA did not come again until 1965.160
In the case of Krystad v. Lau,16 1 the Washington Supreme Court, noting
that there was very little case law which gave substance to the NLA's
policy statement, 162 looked to Wisconsin's 1934 Simplex decision.163
The Krystad court followed the Wisconsin ruling in Simplex in deciding
that the Washington NLAI64 does in fact substantively protect workers
from discharge through the expressed public policy of the state. 165
Court additionally gave the NLA's public policy statement effect by pointing out that it defined the
rights of the parties. Id. at 330. Therefore, the employer, in order to respond to the workers'
demands, must operate within the relationship as defined by the NLA's policy statement. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Trustees of Wis. State Fed'n of Labor v. Simplex Shoe Mfg. Co., 256 N.W. 56, 60-61
(Wis. 1934) (ruling that Wisconsin's version of the NLA granted substantive rights to workers in their
freedom from retaliation when engaging in collective bargaining and concerted activity).
155. 256 N.W. 56 (Wis. 1934).
156. WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 103.51-.62 (West 1997).
157. Trustees of Wis. State Fed'n of Labor v. Simplex Shoe Mfg. Co., 256 N.W. 56, 60 (Wis.
1934).
158. Id. at61.
159. In Simplex, the defendant employer refused to meet with representatives of the Internation-
al Boot and Shoe Workers' Union, which was affiliated with the AFL, in efforts to improve general
working conditions, wages, and hours. Id. at 57.
160. See Krystad v. Lau, 400 P.2d 72, 83 (Wash. 1965) (conferring actionable rights onto
workers to be free from employer interference when seeking to unionize).
161. 400 P.2d 72 (Wash. 1965). In Krystad, employer David Lau and his wife, Kow May Lau,
refused to employ members of the Laundry and Dye Works Drivers' Union to work in their laundry
business. Id. at 73. Unfortunately, the Laus' animosity toward the union came about after Lau himself
had in the past attempted to join the union but had been denied membership because of his Chinese
ancestry. See id.
162. Id. at 78.
163. Id.
164. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.32.011-.020 (1990).
165. See Krystad, 400 P.2d at 83 (deciding that the state's NLA confers substantive rights onto
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Subsequent to Krystad, the Washington courts continued to follow
its holding, but refused to expand its interpretation of Washington's
NLA.16 6 In the 1974 case, International Union of Operating Engineers
Local No. 286 v. Sand Point Country Club,167 the Washington Supreme
Court held that while the NLA conferred actionable rights upon workers
to engage in concerted activity, it did not create an affirmative duty on
the part of employers to enter into collective bargaining discussions with
union representatives once they have been chosen. 168 The Sand Point
court reasoned that the Krystad holding was distinguishable because the
policy statement, which viewed in context of the Act as a whole, ex-
pressed a statutory right. 169 However, the court in Sand Point declined
to expand the interpretation of Washington's NLA as conferring an
implied duty on the part of employers to bargain with union represen-
tatives. 170
Any concern that Washington's NLA had been weakened by the
Sand Point court was resolved five years later in Culinary Workers &
Bartenders Union No. 596 v. Gateway Cafe, Inc.,17 1 in which the holding
of Krystad was upheld.172 Culinary Workers involved an employer who
decided unilaterally which union would represent the workers, thereby re-
stricting workers' choices in designating their own bargaining agent.173
Workers who refused to join the designated union were fired. 174
The Culinary Workers court decided that the employer had inter-
fered with the workers' bargaining rights because it unilaterally decided
which bargaining agent would represent the workers, without consulting
the workers themselves. 175 The court therefore upheld the holding in
workers); see also id. at 81 (addressing the dual purpose of the Act by identifying the original purpose
as being a limitation on judicial intervention: "[b]ut would not the granting of substantive rights by a
declaration of policy likewise be a limitation upon the power of the courts to grant injunctions? Was
not the whole act a limitation on the equity powers of the court?").
166. See Peter B. Gonick, Bravo v. Dolsen Cos.: Shoring Up Employer Bargaining Power by
Sandbagging Nonunion Workers, 70 WASH. L. REV. 203, 210 (1995) (discussing the decisions leading
up to the 1993 Washington Court of Appeals decision of Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 862 P.2d 623 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1993)). The decision by the appellate court in Bravo, which held that farm workers did not
have protection from discharge under the state's NLA was reversed in Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 888 P.2d
147 (Wash. 1995). Id. at 225.
167. 519 P.2d 985 (Wash. 1974).
168. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local No. 286 v. Sand Point Country Club, 519 P.2d 985,
988 (Wash. 1974).
169. Id. at 987; see also Gonick, supra note 166, at 210 (detailing the Sand Point Country Club
decision).
170. Sand Point Country Club, 519 P.2d at 990. The appellants in Sand Point Country Club made
no claim that there had been employer interference with their right to choose union representatives.
Id. at 987.
171. 588 P.2d 1334 (Wash. 1979).
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Krystad by concluding that the NLA conferred actionable rights on
workers to be free from employer interference.176 The historical
development of case law indicates that the NLA, like its successor, the
NLRA, assertively protects workers from discharge due to the worker's
concerted activity.177
2. Both the Norris Laguardia Act and the NLRA Protect
Workers from Employer Interference
The formation of a union and the collective bargaining through
representatives chosen by the workers themselves, is meaningless when
the threat of discharge hangs over workers in their exercise of this
"fundamental" 178 right. 179  As such, the Supreme Court thus held in N.
L. R. B. v. Washington Aluminum Co. 180 that freedom from interference
is a crucial element of the worker's overall right to unionize. 18 1 In
Washington Aluminum Co., unorganized workers walked out in an effort
to call attention to the extreme cold under which they had been made to
work.1 82 All seven workers were fired for their ations.183 The Court
ruled that the employer's actions constituted an unfair labor practice
under Section 7 of the NLRA despite the fact that the workers did not
176. Id. Workers are guaranteed such freedoms under the NLRA as well. See 29 U.S.C. § 158
(a)(2) (1994). Under the NLRA, if an employer interferes with a worker's right to form or participate
in a labor organization, that employer has committed an unfair labor practice. See id. Thus, workers
are guaranteed the same freedom from employer interference under both the NLA and the NLRA.
See Culinary Workers, 588 P.2d at 1345 (holding that the NLA confers actionable rights on workers to
be free from employer interference); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (finding employer interference to be an
unfair labor practice).
177. See Ch. 90, § 2, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1994)) (stating that the work-
er "[s]hall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents
.); see also § 8 of the NLRA (stating "[i]t shall be unfair labor practices for an employer ... to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees . . . to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an
employee because he has filed charges"). Ch. 372, § 8, 49 Stat. 452 (1935) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)).
178. See N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937) (declaring the right of a
worker to select representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining a "fundamental right"). The
Court also clarified that workers should be free to exercise this right by stating: "[d]iscrimination and
coercion to prevent the free exercise of the right of employees to self-organization and representation
is a proper subject for condemnation by competent legislative authority." Id.
179. In Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 186 (1941), the Supreme Court stated:
"[W]e have seen the close link between a bar to employment because of union affiliation and the op-
portunities of labor organizations to exist and to prosper." In this case, the refusal of a company to
hire workers because of their affiliation with the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Work-
ers came within the principles set forth under the NLRA which prohibits the discharge of workers for
union affiliation. Id. at 186-87.
180. 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
181. N.L.R.B. v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962). Here the Court stated, "[I]n-
deed concerted activities by employees for the purpose of trying to protect themselves from working
conditions . . . are unquestionably activities to correct conditions which modem labor-management
legislation treats as too bad to have to be tolerated in a humane and civilized society like ours." Id.




belong to a union and had not provided the employer with formal
demands. 184 The Washington Aluminum Co. Court broadly interpreted
Section 7 of the NLRA to include unorganized workers within its
protection.185 Therefore, workers, even unorganized workers, may leave
their place of work in an effort to better their working conditions.186
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has also ruled that
protected activity covered under the NLRA includes such actions as
employee distribution of union literature on company grounds during
non-working hours. 187 In reasoning that worker protection needed to
be broadened, the Court recognized the dual purpose presented in
Section 7 of the NLRA.188 The general "mutual aid or protection"
language of Section 7 is sufficiently broad to protect activity such as
the distribution of union literature to co-employees,1 89 while still
substantively protecting the worker's rights to "self organization" and
"collective bargaining."190 Thus, the NLRA protects direct bargaining
through the employee-employer relationship, as well as more indirect
activities which may lie outside of this direct relationship.191
184. Id. at 14. The Court reasoned, "[tihe seven employees here were part of a small group of
employees who were wholly unorganized. They had no bargaining representative ... of any kind to
present their grievances to their employer. Under these circumstances, they had to speak for
themselves as best they could." Id. Federal courts have similarly ruled. See Halstead Metal Prods. v.
N.L.R.B., 940 F.2d 66, 69 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. N.L.R.B., 176 F.2d 749,
752-53 (4th Cir. 1949) as authority that unorganized workers are also protected by § 7 of the NLRA);
see also N.L.R.B. v. Tamara Foods, Inc., 692 F.2d 1171, 1179-80 (8th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that § 7
of the NLRA protects workers who walked out of the company plant after repeated notice of
chemical fumes as engaging in protected concerted activity).
185. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 14.
186. See id. at 14 (indicating that a narrow reading of § 7 of the NLRA, "would only tend to
frustrate the policy of the Act to protect the right of workers to act together to better their working
conditions"); see also N.L.R.B. v. Tamara Foods, Inc., 692 F.2d 1171, 1180 (8th Cir. 1982) (ruling that
the walkout by workers after detecting chemical odors was protected activity under § 7 of the NLRA).
187. See Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556, 575-76 (1978) (deciding that the worker distri-
bution of union literature is closely related to the important policies of the NLRA). Federal courts
have made similarly broad rulings. See Hajoca Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 872 F.2d 1169, 1177 (3d Cir. 1989)
(stating that threatening striking workers with dismissal is an unfair labor practice under the NLRA);
see also N.L.R.B. v. Pizza Crust Co. of Pa., Inc., 862 F.2d 49, 51 (3d Cir. 1988) (regarding the
questioning of a worker about the identity of other union members). However, such a right to
distribute union literature is not guaranteed to non-workers. See Lechmere, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 502 U.S.
527, 537 (1992) (finding that non-workers have no right to trespass on an employer's property to
distribute union literature unless no "reasonable" alternative means of access to the workers exists).
188. See Eastex, 437 U.S. at 565 (discussing the legislative intent regarding § 7 of the NLRA).
189. "[P]rotecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purposes of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid and protection." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
190. See Eastex, 437 U.S. at 565.
191. See generally id. at 565-66. In addition to union distribution, other activities which may
occur outside of the direct bargaining relationship between the worker and the employer, but which
are still protected under the NLRA, include workers' use of administrative or judicial forums and
workers' requests to the legislature. See id. at 566.
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The Court identified that the language from Section 7 of the NLRA
was modeled after that found in Section 2 of the NLA. 192 Both Acts
contain language indicating that workers should have both the general
freedom to improve conditions as well as specific protection regarding
concerted activity. 193 Therefore, both the NLRA and the NLA protect
workers' rights from discharge resulting from attempts to better working
conditions.
3. Agricultural Workers are Protected Under the Norris
LaGuardia Act
Broad protection of the rights of workers to better their working
conditions is especially important for the agricultural laborer who is
often unorganized and may be unaware of what constitutes "concerted
activity."1 94 Since the agricultural worker has no recourse under the
FLSA,195 it is especially important that they are protected from having
their vulnerable position taken advantage of.196 The NLA was specific-
ally enacted for the unorganized worker.197
In 1995, the Washington Supreme Court held that agricultural
laborers, like most other workers, could not be fired for attempting to
better their working conditions. 198 In Bravo, dairy workers were dis-
charged after striking in order to improve their conditions after their
192. Id. at 565 n.14.
193. Id. The Court compared the NLRA's language policy on this matter with that of the NLA
by quoting the legislative intent behind this broad policy: "[T]his section of the Norris LaGuardia Act
[§ 2] expresses Congress' recognition of the 'right of wage earners to organize and to act jointly in
questions affecting wages, conditions of labor, and the welfare of labor generally. "' Id. (citing S. REP.
No. 163, at 9 (1932)) (emphasis added).
194. Agricultural workers are especially difficult to organize into labor organizations due pri-
marily to low wages, the migratory and seasonal nature of the work itself, and a historic lack of public
support. See JAMIESON, supra note 47, at 406 (discussing the historic problems of agricultural worker
unionization).
195. See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1994) (exempting agricultural workers from the minimum wage and
overtime pay requirements of the FLSA's wage and hour provisions).
196. The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act [hereinafter AWPA] was
originally enacted in 1983 in an attempt to protect the farm worker through limited measures such as
the regulation of farm labor contractors and farm labor housing. However, it does little to regulate
wages and hours. See Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-470,
96 Stat. 2584 (1983) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-72 (1994)). For a critical discussion
of AWPA, see Marc Linder, Paternalistic State Intervention: The Contradictions of the Legal
Empowerment of Vulnerable Workers, 23 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 733, 755-58 (1990).
197. Section 2 of the Act states:
the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of
contract and to protect his freedom of labor ... it is necessary that he have full freedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing
... and that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, coercion of employers of
labor, or their agents ...
Ch. 90, § 2, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1994)) (emphasis added).
198. Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 888 P.2d 147, 155 (Wash. 1995).
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employer refused to negotiate with them. 199 The Bravo court ruled that
the workers had a cause of action for discharge under the state's NLA
because of their statutory right to be free from employer interference for
engaging in concerted activity.2 00 The court reversed the lower court's
ruling, and reasoned that the state's NLA mandated an expressed public
policy which grants agricultural workers a substantive right to be free
from employer interference.201
However, the Bravo court's holding did not turn on the plaintiffs'
status as agricultural workers since the court specifically did not discuss
their status as farm laborers. 20 2 Rather, the decision was the result of the
court's interpretation of the NLA in granting substantive rights to
unorganized workers to engage in concerted activity and subsequently to
be protected from discharge.203 The court discussed similar NLRA pro-
visions, particularly with respect to the fact that neither the NLA nor the
NLRA limits its protection to only unionized workers. 204 However, the
court did not consider the agricultural exemption from the NLRA or the
FLSA in its discussion of the NLRA.205 Rather, the Washington Supreme
Court concluded that the legislative intent of the state NLA granted
substantive rights to workers. 206 The Bravo court ultimately concluded
that agricultural workers were not excluded from the Washington NLA's
protection .207
The Oregon Court of Appeals has similarly held that agricultural
workers fall within the provisions of Oregon's NLA.208 Specifically, the
court in Rauda v. Oregon Roses, Inc., 209 reasoned that there was noth-
ing in the state's version of the NLA which precluded agricultural
workers from being protected from discharge for concerted activity. 2 10
199. Id. at 149. For a discussion regarding the Bravo case at the appellate level, see Gonick,
supra note 166.
200. Bravo, 888 P.2d at 155. The Bravo court relied heavily on the preceding cases interpreting
the NLA. See Krystad v. Lau, 400 P.2d 72, 83 (Wash. 1965) (interpreting the NLA's policy statement
as conferring substantive rights onto workers); see also Int'l. Union of Operating Eng'rs Local No.
286 v. Sand Point Country Club, 519 P.2d 985, 987 (Wash. 1974) (indicating that Krystad gave
substance to the expressed legislative intent of the NLA).
201. Bravo, 888 P.2d at 155.
202. See generally id. (discussing the NLA with no mention of the plaintiffs' status as farm
laborers).
203. Id. at 152.
204. Id. at 153.
205. Id. The Bravo court compares the NLA and the NLRA only in identifying the ability of
non-unionized workers to establish a claim of wrongful discharge under both Acts. Id. at 150-51.
206. See id. at 155 (discussing the legislative intent of Washington's NLA as granting workers
substantive rights and the freedom from wrongful discharge).
207. See id. (holding that agricultural workers are protected under Washington's NLA, thereby
affording them a wrongful discharge claim).
208. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 662.010-.130 (1997).
209. 935 P.2d 469 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
210. Rauda v. Oregon Roses, Inc., 935 P.2d 469, 471 (Or. Ct. App. 1997). This victory has not
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Instead, the court emphasized that the state's NLA granted rights to all
workers. 21 I
The Rauda court referred to previous interpretations of its own
state's NLA to decide whether the statute conferred actionable rights on
agricultural workers.2 12 The Rauda court decided in the affirmative, as it
looked to the case of City of Roseberg v. Roseberg City Firefighters,2 13
which had previously analyzed the legislative intent surrounding the
public policy statement of the statute. 214 In Roseberg City Firefighters,
the Oregon Supreme Court identified the state's NLA as a recognition of
the importance of workers' rights to collectively bargain. 215
The Rauda court also considered other previous cases such as
Schwab v. Moving Picture Operators2 16 and Wallace v. International
Association of Mechanics.2 17 Both Schwab and Wallace involved strik-
ing and picketing union workers. 218 The Oregon Supreme Court deter-
mined in these cases that the legislative intent behind Oregon's NLA was
to grant workers collective bargaining rights. 219 The Rauda court was
convinced that the policy statement of the NLA did in fact confer action-
gone unnoticed. In Oregon's 1997 legislative term, Senate Bill 1205 passed both houses of the state
legislature and sought to overturn the decision handed down in the Rauda case. While Oregon's
Governor vetoed the bill on August 8, 1997, and other state officials have protested the bill, it is
unclear whether the rights of farm workers recognized in Rauda will be lost should the judgement be
reversed by the Oregon Supreme Court. The Oregon Supreme Court granted review of the Rauda
case on December 16, 1997. Rauda v. Oregon Roses, Inc., 952 P.2d 60 (Or. 1997). As of the time
that this edition went to print, the Oregon Supreme Court had not yet entered a decision on the Rauda
case.
211. Rauda, 935 P.2d at 473.
212. Id. at 471-72.
213. 639 P.2d 90 (1981).
214. Rauda, 935 P.2d at 471. The Rauda court relied upon an indication from the Roseberg City
Firefighters case which stated:
In 1933, the Oregon legislature recognized the interest of laboring people in
organizing for their common welfare. It did so in terms which left no question as to the
importance of the interest and, although statutes regulating labor disputes have been modi-
fied over the years, the declaration of public policy in ORS 662.020 remains unchanged
since its adoption in 1933.
See Rauda, 935 P.2d at 471 (citing City of Roseberg v. Roseberg City Firefighters, 639 P.2d 90 (1981)).
215. Roseberg City Firefighters, 639 P.2d at 100. The court discussed the importance of this right
in the context of unfair labor practices as defined by Oregon's Public Employee Collective Bargaining
Act. See id. at 100 (discussing the Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act).
216. 109 P.2d 600 (Or. 1941). The Schwab court stated:
The restraint imposed upon courts in the use of the injunctive process was intended
to aid working men in their efforts to reach a plane of bargaining equality with employers
by making their 'combination extend beyond one shop,' [sic) and so to raise the
standards of wages and improve the working conditions throughout an entire industry.
Rauda, 935 P.2d at 472 (citing Schwab v. Moving Pictures Operators, 109 P.2d 600, 607 (Or. 1941)).
217. 63 P.2d 1090 (Or. 1936).
218. See Schwab, at 608-09 (upholding an injunction under the state's NLA because of union
efforts to gain a monopoly through the plaintiff's business); Wallace v. Int'l Ass'n of Mechanics, 63
P.2d 1090, 1099 (Or. 1936) (prohibiting an injunction against striking workers).
219. See Rauda, 935 P.2d at 472 (citing Schwab, 109 P.2d at 607; Wallace, 63 P.2d at 1096).
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able rights on all workers, rather than simply limiting the injunctive
power of the courts. 220
However, unlike Bravo the Rauda court did consider the role of the
agricultural labor exemption in the state's version of the NLRA and how
that exemption should affect agricultural workers' inclusion within the
state's NLA.221 The court noted that the legislative history of the NLRA
indicated that the exemption of farm labor was incorporated into the
statute because of the belief that regulation would lead to administrative
problems. 222 More significantly however, the court considered the exclu-
sion in terms of federal preemption. 223
B. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
It has been ruled in one federal district court that the NLRA's agri-
cultural exemption does not preempt state law. 224 Willmar Poultry Co.,
Inc. v. Jones 225 decided that the legislative history of the NLRA evi-
denced a lack of interest on the part of Congress regarding the problems
of farm laborers. 226 The Willmar Poultry court concluded that the exclu-
sion of farm labor from the NLRA was due to congressional indiffer-
ence. 227 Therefore, the court concluded that Congress did not intend to
leave farm labor wholly unregulated, but was rather unconcerned with its
problems. 228 As such, congressional indifference made it possible for
the Willmar Poultry court to rule that the NLRA's exclusion of farm
labor did not preempt state law.229
The courts have indicated that the NLRA's preemption of state law
will occur in three instances, 230 and "may be implied by the nature of
the legislation." 231 The first instance when federal preemption must oc-
cur is when the activity is either protected under Section 7 of the NLRA
or prohibited as an unfair labor practice under Section 8 of the Act.232
The second instance occurs when the NLRB has jurisdiction over a labor
220. Rauda, 935 P.2d at 471.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 473.
223. Id.
224. Willmar Poultry Co. v. Jones, 430 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D. Minn. 1977).
225. 430 F. Supp. 573 (D. Minn. 1977).




230. See id. at 576-77 (giving an analysis of the three instances in which federal preemption over
state action must occur).
231. See Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N.Y. State Labor Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 772 (1947) (discussing the
instances in which federal preemption is appropriate).
232. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959) (indicating that
when it is evident that the actions sought to be regulated by the state are already regulated by § 7 or §
8 of the NLRA, state action must give way).
NOTE 535
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
dispute, but it has declined to assert its jurisdiction.233 Finally, where it is
the intent of Congress to leave an area unregulated from both federal
and state action, the state must refrain from acting.234 The Willmar
Poultry court relied on the third category of cases. 235
In deciding which preemption test to apply, the Willmar Poultry
court decided that since agricultural workers were exempt from the
NLRA, their conduct could not be governed by it at all. 236 Thus, the
NLRB had no jurisdiction over the workers, nor did their activity or the
activity of the employer fall within Sections 7 or 8 of the Act.237 There-
fore, the first and second instances in which federal preemption normally
would govern, thus preventing state law from being applied, did not
apply. 238 The court decided that Congress, in creating the exemption for
agricultural labor, had no intention of leaving agricultural labor wholly
unregulated, which left room for state action to occur. 239 Therefore, agri-
cultural workers came within Wisconsin state law despite being exempt
from the NLRA.240
Similarly, the Rauda court considered the role of federal preemp-
tion regarding the exemption of farm labor under the NLRA.241 The
court relied heavily on the Willmar Poultry ruling and agreed that the ex-
clusion of farm workers from the NLRA did not indicate that Congress
intended for these workers to be unable to gain protection for engaging
in collective action under an alternative statute. 242 As such, the court
ruled that Oregon's public policy, as defined by the state's NLA,
provides for the inclusion of all workers within the NLA's protection. 243
233. See Bethlehem Steel, 330 U.S. at 776 (discussing the NLRB's decision to decline an asser-
tion of jurisdiction in some cases).
234. See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Employment Re-
lations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976) (referencing cases in which congressional intent indicates
that the area should remain unregulated).




239. Id. at 578. The court looked to the Bethlehem Steel case for guidance when the Supreme
Court explained:
[W]here [the NLRAI leaves the employer-employee relation free of regulation in some
aspects, it implies that in such matters federal policy is indifferent, and since it is
indifferent to what the individual of his own volition may do, we can only assume it to be
equally indifferent to what he may do under the compulsion of the state.
See id. (citing Bethlehem Steel Co., 330 U.S. at 733).
240. Willmar Poultry, 430 F.Supp. at 578.





V. NORTH DAKOTA'S NORRIS LAGUARDIA ACT SHOULD
PROTECT AGRICULTURAL WORKERS FROM WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE CLAIMS
North Dakota enacted its own version of the Federal NLA in
1935.244 North Dakota's version of the NLA contains similar language
to that of the Federal NLA, including a public policy statement which
gives the right of collective bargaining to all workers. 245
The North Dakota Supreme Court has not had an occasion to rule
on whether agricultural workers have collective bargaining rights under
the state's NLA. North Dakota has a version of the NLRA,246 which ex-
empts farm workers from its protection.2 47 This exclusion may cause the
court to consider whether the legislative intent surrounding the agricul-
tural exemption from the state's NLRA affects the application of the
state's NLA to North Dakota farm workers. 248 However, other states
such as Oregon and Washington have held that the agricultural exemp-
tion from the NLRA does not exempt farm laborers from the NLA's
protection. 249 Thus, North Dakota should likewise find that the state's
public policy as defined by North Dakota's NLA protects agricultural
workers in their collective bargaining rights.250
244. Norris LaGuardia Act, 1967 N.D. LAWS, S.B. 213, codified at N.D. CENT CODE § 14; 1935
N.D. LAWS, H.B.188, codified at N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 34-08-01, -02, -05 to -13; 1919 N.D. LAWS, H.B.
57, codified at N.D. CENT CODE § 34-08-04 to -04 (1987 & Supp. 1997).
245. Section 2 of the Act states:
For the purpose of the interpretation of the provisions of this chapter, the public
policy of this state is declared to be that a worker of this state must be free to decline to
associate with his fellows, but that he also has full freedom of association, self-organi-
zation, and designation of representatives of his own choosing to negotiate the terms and
conditions of his employment, and that he is free in such matters, as well as in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion, from interference, restraint, or coercion by employers of labor or their agents.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-08-02 (1987).
246. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-12-01 to -14 (1987 & Supp. 1997).
247. "Employee ... does not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer ..
N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-12-01.
248. See Respondent's Brief at 26, Rauda v. Oregon Roses, Inc., 935 P.2d 469 (Or. Ct. App.
1997) (No. 9410-75CV) (citing Appellant's argument that the exclusion of agricultural workers from
the NLRA should preclude their inclusion within Oregon's NLA). The Rauda court held that
agricultural workers were entitled to the NLA's protection. See Rauda, 935 P.2d at 473 (including
agricultural workers within the NLA's protections).
249. See Rauda, 935 P.2d at 473 (deciding that the exclusion of farm workers from the state's
NLRA did not preclude agricultural labor's inclusion within the state's NLA); Bravo v. Dolsen Cos.,
888 P.2d 147, 155 (Wash. 1995) (holding that agricultural workers have a cause of action under the
state's NLA).
250. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-08-02 (declaring the public policy of the state to include the right
of workers to collectively bargain and to be free from employer interference).
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A. AGRICULTURAL WORKERS ARE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES
To date, the North Dakota Supreme Court has only ruled that the
NLA does not include public employees 251 within its protection. 252 In
City of Minot v. General Drivers & Helpers Union No. 74, the court held
that the state's NLA did not prevent an injunction from being issued
against a strike by public employees. 253  The court reasoned that public
employees have a distinct role in society that gives them a special status
with respect to their role as workers. 254  This status derives from the
public employee's service to society rather than to a private employer. 255
The General Drivers court used as its primary authority the United
States Supreme Court case of United States v. United Mine Workers.256
In United Mine Workers, the Supreme Court distinguished private from
public employers, and concluded that the NLA did not apply to
employees working for the government. 257 The Court's reasoning
included an analysis of the definition of "person" within the meaning
of the NLA.258 Since the government could not be considered a "per-
son" for purposes of the NLA, the government could not be involved in
a "labor dispute" for which the Act was designed. 259 Many states have
followed United Mine Workers in ruling that their states' NLA does not
apply to public employees. 260 Appellants in Rauda v. Oregon Roses,
251. See id. § 34-11.1-01 (1987) (defining "public employee").
252. See City of Minot v. General Drivers & Helpers Union, 142 N.W.2d 612, 617 (N.D. 1966)
(holding that the state's NLA does not apply to public employees engaged in a strike).
253. Id. This case involved a strike by the Teamsters Union after contract negotiations broke
down. Id. at 613. The Union picketed the Public Works Building in Minot and asked its workers to
stay away from work. Id. The City asked the court for a temporary restraining order in order to
prevent the Union from picketing, which eventually resulted in a decision by the district court to issue
a permanent injunction against the Union. Id. at 614.
254. Id. at 619. The court stated that public employees "[o]ccupy a status entirely different from
those who carry on a private enterprise. They serve the public welfare and not a private purpose."
Id. (quoting Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 83 A.2d 482, 484-85 (Conn. 1951)).
255. See id. (citing Norwalk Teachers Ass'n, 83 A.2d at 484-85).
256. 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
257. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 275 (1947). In United Mine Workers,
an injunction was issued against the union preventing members from striking because the mines were
under the control of the federal government. Id. at 307.
258. Id.
259. Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1994) (stating that "(n]o court of the United States shall have juris-
diction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or
growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute."); 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1994) (stating that "[a] case shall grow out of a labor dispute when the
case involves persons ... or when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a 'labor
dispute' ... of 'persons participating or interested' therein") (emphasis added).
260. See Sch. Dist. No. 351 Oneida County v. Oneida Educ. Ass'n, 567 P.2d 830, 833 (Idaho
1977); Elder v. City of Jeffersonville, 329 N.E.2d 654, 660 (Ind. 1975); Hanson v. Commonwealth, 181
N.E.2d 843, 848 (Mass. 1962); Delaware River & Bay Auth. v. The Int'l Org. of Masters, Mates &
Pilots, 211 A.2d 789, 795 (N.J. 1965); County of Westchester v. Arfmann, 279 N.Y.S.2d 467, 469
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Inc. also attempted to limit the state NLA's application to farm workers
by comparing them to public employees. 261 A Utah case cited by appel-
lants in Rauda based its conclusion that its state's NLA did not confer
substantive rights on workers because the employees in that case were
public employees. 262
However, agricultural workers are not public employees. 263 They
are engaged in an industry which operates for a profit, in which workers
must have the right to act together in their own best interests without the
fear of discharge. 264 While an employer may discharge a worker for a
justifiable cause, it may not do so because of that worker's present or
previous status in a union. 265 However, the North Dakota Supreme Court
has ruled that even if a worker is involved in a union, that worker may be
discharged because of the worker's inefficiency or insubordination. 266
The motivating factor for the dismissal however, cannot be the worker's
union status.267 As such, the court could thus find that public employees
are different from agricultural workers. 268
(N.Y. App. Div. 1967); Westly v. Bd. of City Comm'rs of Salt Lake City Corp., 573 P.2d 1279, 1280
(Utah 1978); Retail Clerks Local v. Univ. of Wyo., 531 P.2d 884, 888 (Wyo. 1975). But cf.
Charbonnet v. Gerace, 457 So.2d 676, 678 n.2 (La. 1984) (indicating that since a strike by public
employees is not statutorily prohibited, Louisiana's NLA could theoretically cover them); Bd. of Educ.
of City of Minneapolis v. Pub. Sch. Employees' Union Local No. 63, 45 N.W.2d 797, 801 (Minn. 1951)
(deciding that only public employees involved with public safety, such as police officers and
firefighters, are outside of the state's NLA).
261. See Respondent's Brief at 25-26, Rauda(No. 9410-75CV) (referring to Appellant's Opening
Brief at 25-26).
262. See id. (citing Westly, 573 P.2d at 1280). Westly ruled that Utah's NLA did not apply to em-
ployees of the state. Westly, 573 P.2d at 1280; see also Retail Clerkls Local, 531 P.2d at 888 (ruling that
Wyoming's NLA did not confer substantive collective bargaining rights on public employees).
263. See City of Minot v. General Drivers & Helpers Union No. 74, 142 N.W.2d 612, 619 (N.D.
1966) (citing Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 83 A.2d 482, 484-85 (Conn. 1951) (describing
public employees as those who work for the "public welfare," providing them with a status different
from private workers).
264. See id. at 618 (citing Bd. of Educ. of Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Redding, 207
N.E.2d 427, 430 (III. 1965) (addressing the Illinois Supreme Court's description that the profit
incentive in a free economy is a distinguishing factor between private and public employees).
265. Sand v. Queen City Packing Co., 108 N.W.2d 448, 451 (N.D. 1961).
266. Id. at 452.
267. Id. There is now a distinct process by which an employee shall challenge a discharge in a
"mixed motive" case, whereby the reason given by the employer for dismissal must be legitimate and
additional to any reason regarding the worker's union status. See N.L.R.B. v. Transp. Management
Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403-04 (1983) (affirming the NLRB's 1980 decision in Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B.
1083 (1980)). In the Wright Line analysis, the General Counsel of the NLRB must carry the burden of
persuasion in showing that the employer's decision to discharge the worker was motivated by the
worker's union status. Transp. Management Corp., 462 U.S. at 400. The employer can nonetheless
avoid liability if it can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the worker's discharge would
have occurred regardless of union activity. Id. While the employer must show that a discharge would
have nonetheless occurred, the burden of persuasion does not shift from the General Counsel of the
NLRB. Id. at 401. Before the 1983 decision in Transp. Management. there had been a split in the
circuits regarding the adoption of the Wright Line analysis. Id. at 397 n.3. However, it is clear now
that the Wright Line analysis is the standard by which mixed motive cases brought under the NLRA
should be judged. Id. at 403-04.
268. See General Drivers, 142 N.W.2d at 618 (citing Redding, 207 N.E.2d at 430, while discus-
sing the difference between public and private employees).
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B. PROBLEMS FACED BY AGRICULTURAL WORKERS IN NORTH DAKOTA.
Farm workers in North Dakota and across the country face a variety
of problems. 269 While agricultural laborers in North Dakota are entitled
to the minimum wage, 270 language barriers, housing shortages, and
pesticide notification remain realities for farm workers in the state.271
Farm workers' wages, after accounting for inflation, have declined by as
much as twenty percent over the last twenty years. 272 Left with few
alternatives, farm workers have turned to hunger strikes to protest wage
decreases. 273 When faced with such problems, agricultural workers in
North Dakota should be able to exercise some control over their working
conditions. 274 As a result, North Dakota should give substantive effect to
the state's NLA and hold that agricultural workers have the right to
improve their working conditions without the fear of discharge. 275
VI. CONCLUSION
Agricultural workers, like all workers, should be free from the fear
of retaliation and should be able to engage in concerted, collective activ-
ity to improve their working conditions. 276 The NLA is an opportunity
to further congressional intent by protecting workers in these efforts.
Unlike the NLRA, the NLA does not exclude agricultural workers from
its provisions. 277 Public employees have been held to be outside of the
Federal NLA's protection by the United States Supreme Court and
outside of the state NLA's protection by the North Dakota Supreme
269. See generally David M. Saxowsky et al., Employing Migrant Agricultural Workers: Over-
coming the Challenge of Complying with Employment Laws, 69 N.D. L. REV. 307 (1993) (focusing on
farm workers in North Dakota and Minnesota).
270. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-06-01 to -21 (1987) (providing for a minimum wage to all wor-
kers in North Dakota). Employees include "any individual employed by an employer. Provided, an
individual is not an 'employee' while engaged in a ridesharing arrangement, as defined in §8-02-07."
Id. § 34-06-01(2).
271. See Saxowsky et al., supra note 269, at 323-27 (describing challenges faced by both farm
laborers and growers in the Red River Valley).
272. See Mireya Navarro, Florida Tomato Pickers Take on Growers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1998, at
A12 (detailing the plight of 2,500 nonunionized farm workers in Immokalee, Florida).
273. See id. (depicting the 30 day hunger strike by six farm workers in Florida which ended only
after the intervention of former President Jimmy Carter).
274. See American Steel Foundries v. Tricity Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921)
(stating that the individual worker is "helpless in dealing with an employer" in terms of the need for
workers to be able to unionize); see also PATRICK H. MOONEY AND THEO J. M AWKA, FARMERS' & FARM
WORKERS' MOVEMENTS 138 (Irwin T. Sanders ed., 1995) (citing CAREY MCWILLIAMS, FACTORIES IN THE
FIELDS 303-04 (1939)) (declaring that, "[t]he solution to the farm-labor problem can only be achieved
through the organization of farm workers").
275. N.D. CENT CODE § 34-08-02 (1987).
276. See American Steel Foundries, 257 U.S. at 209 (discussing the necessary function served by
unions in providing workers' strength to negotiate with their employers).
277. See 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (defining the public policy of the NLA).
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Court. 27 8 However, agricultural workers work in the private sector and
therefore, occupy a different status than public workers. 279 Agricultural
workers should have the same right to improve their working conditions
as workers in other private employments. 280 Finally, two states have held
that agricultural workers are included within their versions of the
NLA.2 81
The NLA confers substantive rights onto agricultural workers. 282
Exemptions of agricultural labor from other legislation such as the
NLRA and the FLSA should not preclude agricultural labor from being
granted the same collective bargaining rights to which workers of other
industries are entitled. 283 To deny farm labor this right would not only
leave many workers unprotected, but would defeat the expressed legis-
lative intent of the Act. 284
Kayce R. Compton285
278. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 275 (1947); City of Minot v. Gen-
eral Drivers & Helpers Union No. 74, 142 N.W.2d 612, 617 (N.D. 1966) (holding that the NLA does
not apply to public employees).
279. See General Drivers, 142 N.W.2d at 619 (citing Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ.,
83 A.2d 482, 484-85 (Conn. 1951)).
280. See N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I, 33 (1937) (declaring the right to
collectively bargain to be "fundamental").
281. See Rauda v. Oregon Roses, Inc., 935 P.2d 469, 473 (Or. Ct. App. 1997); Bravo v. Dolsen
Cos., 888 P.2d 147, 155 (Wash. 1995) (including agricultural workers within NLA protection in
Oregon and Washington).
282. See Rauda, 935 P.2d at 473; Bravo, 888 P.2d at 152 (granting substantive rights under the
state's NLA to agricultural workers).
283. See Rauda, 935 P.2d at 473 (discussing public policy as requiring Oregon's NLA to include
all workers within its protection).
284. See Krystad v. Lau, 400 P.2d 72, 83 (Wash. 1965); Trustees of Wis. State Fed'n of Labor v.
Simplex Shoe Mfg. Co., 256 N.W. 56, 60 (Wis. 1934) (declaring that the public policy of the state
gives workers the freedom from discharge because of their union status and activity); see also
N.L.R.B. v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962) (discussing that the NLRA's similar policy of
advocating workers' rights to act in concert to better their working conditions should be followed).
285. Many thanks to D. Michael Dale and everyone at the Oregon Law Center and Oregon
Legal Services for their inspiration; to Professor Randy H. Lee of the UND School of Law for hi
helpful insight; to my Editor Paul D. Odegaard for his continuous support; and finally to Vernon whol
read (almost) every draft.

